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Abstract
This article addresses the question whether the European Union defaulted on the 
‘strict observance’ of international law and ‘respect’ for the UN Charter, which 
are now express objectives of the EU following the Lisbon reform, in the course 
of the famous Kadi cases. With the final appeals judgment having been handed 
down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in July 2013, this question 
can now be conclusively answered in the negative. Despite the general tension 
these legal challenges created between EU law and international law, the EU 
managed, in the course of twelve years, to weave a seamless coat of compliance 
with international law. The article contrasts this finding with the general aca-
demic discourse on this case law, which tends to depict Kadi as a ‘sacrifice’ of 
compliance with international law for the benefit of fundamental rights (as well 
as the autonomy of the EU legal order). By retracing the entirety of this string of 
cases, the article demonstrates that, all rhetoric aside and for all practical pur-
poses, the EU courts and other institutions managed to avoid any violations of 
international legal obligations towards the UN Security Council in this matter. 
The EU discontinued its own sanctions against Mr Kadi only after he had been 
delisted by the UN by means of a political decision, not by virtue of judicial in-
tervention.
* Senior Researcher, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and Associate Fellow, Leuven Centre 
for Global Governance Studies, KU Leuven. The author would like to thank Ester Herlin-Karnell 
and Claudio Matera for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. The usual disclaimer 
applies.
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1. INTRODUCTION: KADI AND THE CONUNDRUM OF  
 COMPLIANCE
The Kadi saga, next to the important constitutional questions it raises for the 
European Union,1 shines the spotlight on the question of the ‘tormented’2 relation-
ship between the EU and international law, in particular the United Nations. In 
the by now famous Opinion preceding the 2008 Kadi judgment, Advocate Gen-
eral Miguel Maduro noted that the legal order of the EU and international law do 
not ‘pass by each other like ships in the night’.3 He continued by asserting that‚ 
on the contrary, the EU has ‘traditionally played an active and constructive part 
on the international stage’.4
This traditional sentiment of seeing the EU as völkerrechtsfreundlich (a German 
term meaning ‘friendly towards international law’)5 has now found prominent 
expression in the EU Treaties, following the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The ‘strict observance and the development of international law, includ-
ing respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’6 is now one of the 
codified objectives of the Union.7 Indeed, the UN Charter commands ‘respect’ 
1. These concern, on the one hand, the competence of the EU to adopt sanctions against individuals 
under the EU Treaties preceding the Lisbon reform, and on the other, the safeguarding of fundamental 
rights within the EU in this particular context. See, from among the vast amount of literature, 
respectively, M. Cremona, ‘EC Competence, “Smart Sanctions”, and the Kadi Case’, 28 Yearbook 
of European Law (YEL) (2009) p. 559; and E. Cannizzaro, ‘Security Council Resolutions and EC 
Fundamental Rights: Some Remarks on the ECJ Decision in the Kadi Case’, 28 YEL (2009) p. 539; 
and discussing both aspects, D. Halberstam and E. Stein, ‘The United Nations, the European Union, 
and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order’, 46 
CML Rev. (2009) p. 13 at pp. 36-61.
2. J. Wouters, ‘The Tormented Relationship between International Law and EU Law’, in 
P. Bekker, R. Dolzer and M. Waibel, eds., Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy: 
Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010) p. 198.
3. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v. Council and Commission, Opinion of Advocate 
General Poiares Maduro [2008] ECR I-06351, para. 22.
4. Ibid.
5. See in this vein, e.g., F. Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law’, 
in M. Cremona, ed., Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2008) p. 37; and C. Timmermans, ‘The EU and International Public Law’, 4 EFA Rev. (1999) p. 181; 
contesting this sentiment, J. Klabbers, ‘Völkerrechtsfreundlich? International Law and the Union 
Legal Order’, in P. Koutrakos, ed., European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2011) p. 115.
6. Art. 3(5) Treaty on European Union (TEU); note also Art. 21(1), first subpara., TEU, which 
highlights ‘respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’ as founding 
principles of the EU and guidance for its external action; and Art. 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, according 
to which the EU shall ‘consolidate and support … the principles of international law’ and ‘preserve 
peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter, …’. 
7. This is part of a wider trend of the ‘dynamic internationalization’ of EU primary law, which 
can also be observed in many national constitutions, see J. Larik, ‘Shaping the International Order 
as an EU Objective’, in F. Amtenbrink and D. Kochenov, eds., The European Union’s Shaping of 
the International Legal Order (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2013) p. 62.
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given that it situates itself at the apex of all international agreements, stipulating 
that whenever states face a conflict between their obligations ‘under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obli-
gations under the present Charter shall prevail’.8 The obligations include compli-
ance with the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as the 
primary organ for the safeguarding of international peace and security.9
The entire Kadi saga, which has preoccupied the EU, the UN and legal schol-
arship for more than a decade, has become emblematic of the EU being torn be-
tween being compliant with the international law, on the one hand, and upholding 
fundamental rights as enshrined in its own legal order, on the other. This saga was 
– finally – concluded in July 2013, when the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU, before the Lisbon Treaty known as the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ)) handed down its appeals judgment, commonly known as Kadi II. Already 
in October 2012, however, Mr Kadi had been taken off the UN ‘blacklist’. The 
EU had followed suit shortly thereafter by taking him off its respective list (see 
infra 3).
Bruno Simma once remarked en passant on the Kadi judgment of 2008: 
‘I cannot avoid the impression that, maybe, once the dust has settled, the decision 
will share the reputation of quite a few ECJ leading cases of being grandiose on 
principles without being of much help to the individual claimant.’10 With Mr Kadi 
having been delisted, the Kadi cases off the docket in Luxembourg and the dust 
having settled, this article revisits this seminal string of case law in light of one 
straightforward question: All ‘grandiose’ rhetoric aside, did the EU at any point 
violate its, or its Member States’, international obligations towards the United 
Nations? Regardless of causing a considerable scholarly stir, instead of passing 
by each other ‘like ships in the night’, did EU and international law actually graze 
each other in the course of these events? The answer provided here is, for all 
practical purposes, ‘no’. Even though the discourse has come to celebrate the 
judgments of the CJEU as a valiant defence of fundamental rights and the rule of 
law through judicial review in the EU, it is argued here that for the past twelve 
years, the EU was in fact living up to its objective of observing its international 
legal obligations, thus sewing a seamless coat of compliance with international 
8. Art. 103 UN Charter. Note in this respect also Art. 30(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT); Art. 30(6) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations (VCLTIO); further on the special significance 
of this provision for the international legal order, A. Paulus and J. Leiß, ‘Article 103’, in B. Simma, 
et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. 2, 3rd edn. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2012) p. 2110 (and at pp. 2131-2132 in particular on its effect on the EU and its 
Member States).
9. Art. 25 UN Charter. That the supremacy of Art. 103 extends to Security Council resolutions 
was confirmed in Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports (1992) p. 3, para. 42.
10. B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’, 20 EJIL 
(2009) p. 265 at p. 294, fn. 122.
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law. This fabric remains under considerable strain, with numerous questions on 
the interaction between the UN and EU levels still unresolved. It may yet tear in 
future litigation. In the Kadi cases, however, the EU institutions, including the 
CJEU, certainly ensured that it stayed intact.
In order to elaborate on this argument, this article first sketches out the main-
stream discourse regarding Kadi and the EU’s compliance with international law. 
It subsequently confronts the main sentiments from this discourse with the incon-
trovertible fact, as retraced here, that the EU did actually comply with its interna-
tional duties. It concludes with a note of caution as to rhetoric and reality, as well 
as with a reflection on the real winners and losers in the Kadi saga.
2. DISCERNING DISCOURSES: THE PAROCHIAL SAVIOUR OF  
 UNIVERSAL RIGHTS
Ever since the CJEU was called upon to rule on Mr Kadi’s legal challenges against 
the sanctions imposed against him by virtue of UNSC resolutions, which were 
implemented faithfully by the EU, the Court was very closely followed by schol-
arship as well as by the UN. Two principal sentiments run through the ensuing 
academic commentary and the reports of the responsible UN monitoring body: 
Either that compliance with international law is being sacrificed for the, arguably 
more noble, cause of safeguarding fundamental rights and the rule of law in the 
EU; or that a regional court is on the brink of casting the EU and its Member States 
into a state of non-compliance with obligations under the UN Charter, which 
potentially may undermine the UN and its system of collective security as a whole.
Regarding the UN, the latter sentiment, unsurprisingly, is the prevalent one. 
The Monitoring Team set up under the UNSC to keep track of the implementation 
of its targeted anti-terror sanctions regime has always kept a close watch on the 
Kadi litigation. Following the 2005 decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI, 
after the Lisbon reform renamed the General Court), which was the first judgment 
by an EU court in these cases, it noted in its report to the relevant Security Coun-
cil Committee that while the court had ‘denied all the applicants’ claims and 
upheld the sanctions, as well as the primacy of the Security Council when acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’, it had ‘also ruled, appar-
ently for the first time, that courts could review Security Council decisions to 
ensure that they comply with internationally recognized fundamental norms of 
human rights from which neither Member States nor the United Nations may 
derogate’.11
Subsequently, in reaction to the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in early 
2008, the Monitoring Team report remarked that if the CJEU was to follow him 
11. Letter dated 8 March 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), 4th report of the Monitoring Team, 10 March 2006, S/2006/154, 
p. 46, para. 5.
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in its appeals judgment ‘there is a real possibility that the regulation used by the 
27 member States of the European Union to implement the sanctions will be held 
invalid’12 and that, furthermore, this would in all likelihood ‘trigger similar chal-
lenges that could quickly erode enforcement’.13 The Monitoring Team perceived 
the risk that ‘the precedent of a decision that invalidated the sanctions, especially 
one affecting so many States, might lead to similar problems in other States outside 
the European Union’.14 On the Kadi I judgment as such, the Team remarked that 
it represented ‘arguably the most significant legal development to affect the regime 
since its inception’.15 The report acknowledged, though, that despite the judgment, 
the measures against Mr Kadi continued to be implemented (see further infra 3), 
noting also that new legal challenges may arise in the future.16
Such a challenge took shape in the Kadi II series of cases. Commenting on the 
judgment of the General Court of September 2010, the Monitoring Team report 
stated that here the former Court of First Instance now maintained the position of 
the Court of Justice, that being in the words of the report ‘that European Union 
law is distinct and equal in authority to Chapter VII resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council’.17 This, according the Monitoring Team, ‘challenges the legal 
authority of the Security Council in all matters, not just in the imposition of sanc-
tions’.18
In awaiting the final appeals judgment in Kadi II, the Monitoring Team con-
tinued to refer to the ruling of the CJEU as one of the ‘outside factors [which] 
might upset’ the ‘stable, if temporary, equilibrium with respect to due process 
issues’ which the sanction regime was said to have reached after reforms effected 
up to that point in time.19 The Monitoring Team seemed to have had a brief mo-
ment of hopefulness following Advocate General Bot’s Opinion in Kadi II, which 
was overall more deferential to the UN level. Given that he acknowledged chang-
es that had been effected in the UN sanctions regime in the course of time (see 
further infra 3), notably the work of the Office of the Ombudsperson,20 the report 
12. Letter dated 13 May 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), 8th report of the Monitoring Team, 14 May 2008, S/2008/324, 
p. 17, para. 40.
13. Ibid. (footnote omitted).
14. Ibid.
15. Letter dated 11 May 2009 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), 9th report of the Monitoring Team, 13 May 2009, S/2009/245, 
p. 10, para. 19.
16. Ibid., p. 11, para. 20.
17. Letter dated 13 April 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), 11th report of the Monitoring Team, 13 April 2011, S/2011/245, 
p. 14, para. 30.
18. Ibid.
19. Letter dated 31 December 2012 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), 13th report of the Monitoring Team, 
31 December 2012, S/2012/968, p. 9, para. 17. 
20. The Office of the Ombudsperson was established in late 2009 by virtue of UN Security Council 
Res. 1904 (2009), S/RES/1904, 7 December 2009, para. 20.
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of the Monitoring Team saw this as ‘potentially paving the way for the European 
Court of Justice to accommodate the Al-Qaida sanctions regime from a due process 
perspective’.21 However, these hopes remained unfulfilled, as the Team noted in 
its subsequent report, in commenting on the Kadi II decision, that the CJEU had 
not been ‘persuaded by arguments that improvements to delisting procedures since 
2008 diminished the need for such searching review by European courts’.22 The 
report looked to the future by noting in vague and inconclusive terms that the 
Monitoring Team ‘will continue to engage with European Union officials on list-
ing challenges at the European Union level and on due process issues more 
broadly’.23
In terms of scholarly appraisal, the Kadi saga has spawned a substantial amount 
of literature.24 This is not least due to the fact that the case is situated at the inter-
section of both the relationship between EU and international law as well as the 
balance between pursuing international security and the safeguarding of indi-
vidual rights and due process, both topics being prone to great academic popular-
ity. Hence, unsurprisingly, each stage of this case law was extensively scrutinized 
and commented upon by academic observers.
Overall, according to a survey conducted by Sara Poli and Maria Tzanou, the 
2005 judgment of the CFI ‘has been considered disappointing since the Court has 
chosen to defend fundamental rights as being protected by jus cogens rather than 
applying the higher standard of protection guaranteed within the EC legal order’.25 
Moreover, the assertion of this court that the (then) European Community was 
bound by the UN Charter because it had succeeded in the obligations of the Mem-
ber States much in the same way as it happened with the GATT was met with 
fierce criticism.26
The scorn that this judgment received from a human rights perspective was not 
compensated by praise from general public international lawyers. On the contrary, 
given the rather strange manner in which the Court construed the notion of jus 
cogens, the judgment was deemed to ‘add to the argument that national and re-
gional courts are in fact not the proper place for the review of Security Council 
21. Letter dated 2 August 2013 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), 14th report of the Monitoring Team, 2 August 
2013, S/2013/467, p. 12, para. 29.
22. Letter dated 22 January 2014 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), 15th report of the Monitoring Team, 23 January 
2014, 22 January 2014, p. 12, para. 28.
23. Ibid., p. 12, para. 29.
24. See, e.g., S. Poli and M. Tzanou, ‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature’, 28 YEL 
(2009) p. 533; and the collection of references in R. Streinz, ‘Does the European Court of Justice 
Keep the Balance between Individual and Community Interest in Kadi?’, in U. Fastenrath, et al., eds., 
From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2011) p. 1118 at p. 1121, fn. 21.
25. Poli and Tzanou, supra n. 24, p. 548. 
26. Ibid., pp. 548-549.
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measures’.27 The fact that the Court of First Instance had introduced a standard of 
review according to which it deemed itself competent to rule on the lawfulness of 
the contested measures was considered to have the potential of ‘undermining the 
system of collective security’ of the UN,28 as it gave domestic courts the power 
of ‘ordering the state to act contrary to the sanctions committee’s lists’.29 In this 
way, it really seemed to combine the worst of both worlds: Throwing overboard 
the protection of individual rights guaranteed in the EU legal order as well as the 
supremacy of the UN Charter in international law. As I argued in an earlier article, 
by trying to please all, the CFI ended up being a ‘false friend’ of international 
law,30 and indeed became quite unpopular with the academic community.
In 2008, in contrast, it was the moment for those emphasising the importance 
of human rights as well as the autonomy of the EU legal order to rejoice. It has 
been observed that ‘overall positive assessments were more conspicuous than 
those on the CFI’s ruling’.31 Some commentators, such as Martin Scheinin, argued 
that there was even support in the judgment also from an international law per-
spective: ‘On the whole, and also in respect of institutional United Nations law, 
the CJEU did the right thing in Kadi.’32 Praise even came from Strasbourg in the 
form of a Concurring Opinion by Judge Malinverni of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) in the Nada v. Switzerland case.33 The Judge described the 
judgment ‘as historic, as it made the point that respect for human rights formed 
the constitutional foundation of the European Union, with which it was required 
to ensure compliance, including when examining acts implementing resolutions’.34 
For him, the CJEU is clearly the trailblazer, raising the question whether the 
ECtHR ‘as guarantor of respect for human rights in Europe, [should] not be more 
27. L. van den Herik, ‘The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better 
Protection of the Individual’, 20 Leiden JIL (2007) p. 797 at p. 801 (emphasis in the original). Note 
also J. D’Aspremont and F. Dopagne, ‘Kadi: The ECJ’s Reminder of the Elementary Divide between 
Legal Orders’, 5 IOLR (2008) p. 371 at p. 378, who call the judges’ application of international law 
in this case ‘adventurous’.
28. Van den Herik, supra n. 27, p. 801.
29. Ibid., p. 799.
30. J. Larik, ‘Two Ships in the Night or in the Same Boat Together? Why the European Court of 
Justice Made the Right Choice in the Kadi Case’, College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper No. 3/2009, 
June 2009, p. 6, available at <https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-paper/
edp_3_2009_larik.pdf?download=1>, visited 17 January 2014.
31. Poli and Tzanou, supra n. 24, p. 540.
32. M. Scheinin, ‘Is the ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?’, 28 YEL 
(2009) p. 637 at p. 650.
33. Note that the ECtHR also quoted from Kadi approvingly in the judgment, in Nada v. 
Switzerland, Appl. No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012, para. 212. Further on the interaction between 
the two European courts in matters of targeted sanctions, F. Fabbrini and J. Larik, ‘Dialoguing for 
Due Process: Kadi, Nada, and the Accession of the EU to the ECHR’, Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Working Paper No. 125, November 2013, available at <http://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/
publications/working_papers/new_series/wp121-130/wp125-larik-fabbrini.pdf>. 
34. ECtHR 12 September 2012, Nada v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 10593/08, Concurring Opinion 
of Judge Malinverni, para. 18.
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audacious than the European Court of Justice … when it comes to addressing and 
settling the sensitive issue of conflict of norms that underlies the present case’.35 
Faced with such conflict and charged with upholding human rights, according to 
Judge Malinverni, requires the recasting of the primacy of the UN Charter, or at 
least the Security Council resolutions adopted under its authority, ‘in relative 
terms’.36
Others, however, abhorred the fact that the CJEU had arrogated to itself the 
power to question the full implementation of UNSC resolutions by the EU. From 
a scholarly perspective focussed on the UN, the judgment was seen as ‘a hardly 
veiled threat to use quasi-constitutional principles of the law of the European 
Union to disregard the obligations of EU Member States under the UN Charter’.37 
Most vocally, Gráinne de Búrca criticized the CJEU for what she called the ‘chau-
vinist and parochial tones’ of its judgment.38 According to De Búrca, the Court 
adopted ‘a strongly pluralist approach which emphasized the internal and external 
autonomy and separateness of the EC’s legal order from the international domain’, 
and went on to compare the judgment to that of the United States Supreme Court 
in Medellin.39 In doing so, she noted that the CJEU not only provided
‘a striking example for other states and legal systems that may be inclined to assert 
their local constitutional norms as a barrier to the enforcement of international law, but 
more importantly it suggests a significant paradox at the heart of the EU’s relationship 
with the international legal order, the implications of which have not begun to be 
addressed.’40
The 2010 judgment, in which Mr Kadi challenged the follow-up measures ad-
opted against him in the wake of the Kadi I judgment, can be seen as a judicial 
endorsement by the General Court (the former Court of First Instance) of the ap-
proach adopted by the Court of Justice. Even though the Court did not fail to 
highlight that its reasoning had arguably received some support elsewhere,41 it did 
align itself with the ‘in principle full review’ standard of the Court of Justice.42 
35. Ibid., para. 20.
36. Ibid., para. 22.
37. Paulus and Leiß, supra n. 8, p. 2113.
38. G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’, 
51 Harv. ILJ (2010) p. 1 at p. 4.
39. Medellin v. Texas, 552 US 491 (2008). This case concerned a Mexican citizen on death row 
in Texas, his consular rights under the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, the application of 
that convention as well as decisions of the International Court of Justice in the US legal order.
40. De Búrca, supra n. 38, p. 49. Less outspoken, but raising the concern of the fragmentation 
of international law, K. Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting International Law: 
The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights’, 9 Human Rights L Rev. (2009) 
p. 288.
41. Case T-85/09 Kadi v. Commission [2010] ECR II-5177, paras. 112-22.
42. Ibid., para. 126. See further A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: The 
ECJ’s Predicament and the Consequences for Member States’, 7 EuConst (2011) p. 481 at p. 509.
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Even if, according to one observer, ‘an international legal meltdown’ is not 
impending,43 he concludes that the General Court put the Court of Justice under 
pressure to find a ‘balanced approach that does not escalate the conflict with the 
UN but also does not backpedal its commitment to fundamental rights too much, 
or too visibly’.44 Another commentator lauded the ‘clear and welcome presumption 
in favour of a broad, entitlements-based conception of liberty over deference to 
considerations of security in the judgment of the General Court’.45 Overall, one 
could say that the 2010 judgment is seen as cementing a victory for human rights, 
protected by the EU and its courts, over international security, as pursued by the 
UNSC.
In the 2013 Kadi II judgment, which concludes this series of legal challenges, 
the CJEU confirmed the annulment of the measures due to persisting violations 
of fundamental rights (see further infra 3).46 As Niamh Nic Shuibhne notes, ‘while 
the Court rejected aspects of the reasoning applied by the General Court, it upheld 
the annulment of the contested Regulation on the grounds that the rights of the 
defence protected under EU law had not been adequately respected’.47 Thus far, 
the scholarly assessment of this decision seems to continue the overall series of 
praise as standing up for human rights and the rule of law. According to Filippo 
Fontanelli, the value of the judgment resides ‘in its systemic impact, as it incarnates 
the idea that certain fundamental rights cannot be silenced under the cover of 
generic security concerns, or of knee-jerk deference to the UN Security Council’s 
action’.48 Notes of caution, nonetheless, continue to be issued as well with regard 
to other, less beneficial ‘systemic’ consequences. Erika de Wet, for instance, 
stresses that ‘the approach of the CJEU carries with it the risk of the devaluation 
of international human rights law, as well as of legal uncertainty’.49 According to 
her, this ‘fuels the perception that an irreconcilable norm conflict exists between 
a UNSC sanctions regime and domestic or regional regimes that value the protec-
tion of human rights’,50 with a possible ensuing ‘fragmentary effect on the unified 
system foreseen in the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security’.51
43. Cuyvers, supra n. 42, p. 501.
44. Ibid., p. 510.
45. H.J. Hooper, ‘Liberty before Security: Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Commission 
(No. 2) [2010] ECR 00000 (30 September 2010)’, 18 European Public Law (2012) p. 457 at p. 469.
46. Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United 
Kingdom v. Kadi (Kadi II), judgment of 18 July 2013, not yet reported.
47. N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘Being Bound’ (Editorial), 38 European L Rev. (2013) p. 435 at p. 436. See 
extensively on the Kadi II judgment, M. Avbelj, F. Fontanelli and G. Martinico, eds., Kadi on Trial: 
A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment (London, Routledge, forthcoming 2014).
48. F. Fontanelli, ‘Kadieu: Connecting the Dots – From Resolution 1267 to Judgment C-584/10 P 
– The Coming of Age of Judicial Review’, in M. Avbelj, F. Fontanelli and G. Martinico, eds., Kadi 
on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment (London, Routledge, forthcoming 2014). 
49. E. de Wet, ‘From Kadi to Nada: Judicial Techniques Favouring Human Rights over United 
Nations Security Council Sanctions’, 12 Chinese JIL (2013) p. 787 at p. 799.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
J. LARIK32 NILR 2014
In sum, an overarching and prevalent theme of the Kadi saga was the disruptive 
potential of the decisions of the EU Courts regarding compliance with interna-
tional law, more particularly obedience to resolutions of the UNSC, adopted under 
the UN Charter as the supreme document of the international legal order. Conse-
quently, in the various scholarly assessments of this case law, criticisms were 
directed at the CJEU for disrespecting obligations under international law. In the 
watchful eyes of the Monitoring Team of the Security Council, this carried a 
disconcerting threat for overall compliance with UN targeted sanctions around 
the world. Praise, by contrast, was framed in academic commentary in terms of 
defending human rights and judicial review against an overzealous Security Coun-
cil. Such defiance was then acknowledged as condoning non-compliance, yet cast 
as a worthwhile cause. Respect for international law was sacrificed for the sake 
of an arguably ‘higher end’. Yet others then even attempt to justify the reasoning 
of the CJEU by reference to breaches by the UNSC of its own obligations under 
international law.52 There is, however, another way to look at this case law, which 
corresponds to the actual compliance of the EU and its Member States with inter-
national law.
3. RETRACING REALITY: ‘STRICT OBSERVANCE’  
 THROUGHOUT
Compliance with international law is a cherished principle in the EU. There is 
long-standing case law of the CJEU on the Union being bound by general inter-
national law and on giving preference to interpretations of its own laws that are 
consistent with international law.53 After the Lisbon reform, the ‘strict observance’ 
of international law has been enshrined as a general objective of the EU in the 
primary law.54 The CJEU, subsequently, has taken cognizance of this textual foun-
dation.55
Nevertheless, the preparedness of the EU to abide by international law is not 
boundless.56 As a matter of principle, the Kadi case law clarified that while the 
52. Scheinin, supra n. 32, pp. 650-653; for an elaborate framing of non-compliance with such 
resolutions as legitimate countermeasures against the UNSC see A. Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the 
Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2011).
53. See, e.g., Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, para. 9; Case 
104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641; and Case 181-73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449; and reiterated 
in Kadi, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission 
[2008] ECR I-6351, para. 291. See further extensively E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R. Wessel, 
eds., International Law as Law of the European Union (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 2012).
54. Art. 3(5) TEU.
55. Case C-366/10 The Air Transport Association of America and Others [2011] ECR I-13755, 
para. 101.
56. See Klabbers, supra n. 5.
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EU is ‘beholden to’57 international law, within its autonomous legal order, ‘con-
stitutional’ principles such as effective fundamental rights protection through 
judicial review trump compliance with international law. This is after all what 
prompted the general tenor of scholarly commentary referred to above: The CJEU 
drew the line on where compliance with international law should end and beyond 
which it would defend human rights as part of EU law against any outside threats.58 
Even in times of global emergencies such as international terrorism, according to 
the common narrative, Luxembourg spoke up for individual rights, the rule of law 
and judicial review.
But now that the Kadi saga has been concluded, it is worthwhile to take a step 
back and ask: Did the CJEU at any point put the EU or its Member States in a real 
state of non-compliance with international law? By carefully retracing this case 
law and the institutional responses to it, the answer must and can only be: No.
It is undeniable that in Kadi the CJEU asserted the autonomy of the EU legal 
order and its constitutional credentials. It furthermore professed itself to be the 
guarantor of fundamental rights and the rule of law, standing up against the ‘Kaf-
kaesque’59 sanctions machinery at the UN. What it carefully avoided for more than 
a decade, however, was to violate international law, i.e., not to practice the ‘strict 
observance’ of international law under Article 3(5) TEU. Even though Mr Kadi 
had been successful thrice in a row with his judicial challenges at the EU Courts 
ever since his first appeal (i.e., in 2008, 2010 and 2013), the measures deemed 
unlawful by the CJEU were only effectively annulled after he had been delisted 
by the UN and subsequently by the European Commission concerning the imple-
mentation of these sanctions in the EU. His financial assets, therefore, were un-
frozen by virtue of a political decision, and with the help of the Office of the 
Ombudsperson at the UN ‘1267 Sanctions Committee’. They were not undone by 
judicial intervention, which took place only after that fact.
Let us rewind the story and go back to the beginning. On 17 October 2001, the 
UNSC added Mr Kadi to a so-called ‘blacklist’, requiring his assets to be frozen 
in view of his suspected involvement in the financing of international terrorism.60 
On 19 October 2001, the EU responded by implementing the measures of the 
Security Council by adding Mr Kadi to its own list and thus subjecting him to 
restrictive measures within the EU.61 Mr Kadi subsequently lodged an action for 
57. Kadi v. Council and Commission, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, supra n. 3, 
para. 21.
58. See N. Lavranos, ‘Protecting European Law from International Law’, 15 EFA Rev. (2010) p. 
265. Wouters, supra n. 2, p. 221 notes that in Kadi, ‘the ECJ adopted a strongly dualist vision of the 
relationship between EC/EU law and international law, emphasising the autonomy, authority and 
separateness of the EC legal order’.
59. I. Ley, ‘Legal Protection Against the UN-Security Council Between European and International 
Law: A Kafkaesque Situation?’, 8 German LJ (2007) p. 279.
60. ‘Security Council Committee concerning Afghanistan issues a further addendum’, Press 
Release SC/7180, 19 October 2001, available at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7180.doc.
htm>, visited 15 January 2014.
61. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2062/2001 of 19 October 2001 amending, for the third 
time, Council Regulation (EC). No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to 
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the annulment of these measures before the EU courts on grounds of violations 
of his fundamental rights as well as lack of competence.62
Four years later, the General Court ‘discovered’ in its 2005 judgment a jus 
cogens standard which allowed it to review the EU implementing measures as 
well as, vicariously, UNSC measures. It concluded, however, that against such a 
standard no fundamental rights breaches could be detected and rejected Mr Kadi’s 
challenge. In view of this dismissal, the measures, of course, stayed in effect. As 
controversial as the reasoning of the CFI was (see supra 2), it certainly maintained 
the Union in a state of ‘strict observance’ of international law. While the jus cogens 
argument was in conflict with mainstream international legal opinion, a conflict 
with the UN Charter was not created.
Subsequently, Advocate General Maduro, in his Opinion of January 2008, 
employed a very different approach by departing from the autonomy of the Union 
legal order and emphasizing the effective protection of fundamental rights. In the 
Opinion, he avowed himself to be fully aware that such an approach, if followed 
through to its logical conclusion, would lead to violating obligations under inter-
national law. This, however, would be international law’s problem, according to 
the Advocate General:
‘To the extent that such a ruling would prevent the Community and its Member States 
from implementing Security Council resolutions, the legal consequences within the 
international legal order remain to be determined by the rules of public international 
law.’63
Even though, he continued, this may ‘inconvenience the Community and its Mem-
ber States in their dealings on the international stage’,64 the application of such 
constitutional principles by the Court of Justice within the autonomous legal order 
of the EU ‘is without prejudice to the application of international rules on State 
responsibility or to the rule enunciated in Article 103 of the UN Charter’.65 Had 
the Court of Justice followed him all the way, this would have led to the ‘zero 
hour’ of non-compliance with international law.
The Court of Justice, in its landmark judgment of September 2008, followed 
the Advocate General in terms of reasoning, in particular with regard to the au-
tonomy of the Union legal order, the paramount nature of fundamental rights and 
Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources 
in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 337/2000, OJ 2001, 
L 277/25.
62. On the intricate question of (pre-Lisbon) EU competence to adopt such targeted restrictive 
measures, see Cremona, supra n. 1. The Lisbon reform has resolved this issue, as Art. 215(2) Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) now grants the EU such an explicit power.
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the necessity of judicial review. Recalling its ruling in Les Verts,66 it underlined 
that the EU
‘is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions 
can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, 
the EC Treaty, which established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures 
designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the 
institutions.’67
Consequently, it deemed it to be incumbent on itself to ‘ensure the review, in 
principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of 
the fundamental rights’,68 including those acts which ‘are designed to give effect 
to the resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations’.69
Crucially, however, it did not go as far as to invalidate the challenged EU 
measures right away. Even though it concluded that the measures ought to be 
annulled given their inconsistency with fundamental rights as protected within the 
Union legal order, the Court acknowledged that annulment with immediate effect 
‘would be capable of seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness of 
the restrictive measures’.70 In other words, since it did not know whether Mr Kadi 
actually deserved to be blacklisted as a financier of terrorism, unfreezing his funds 
was deemed imprudent. Instead, the Court ruled that the effects of the contested 
measures should be maintained ‘for a period that may not exceed three months 
running from the date of delivery of this judgment’.71 This should then allow the 
European Commission to remedy the situation from the point of view of protect-
ing fundamental rights. As the judgment was rendered on 3 September 2008, 
compliance with international law was thus assured at least until 3 December 2008.
In the wake of the judgment, the Commission sent Mr Kadi a letter containing 
a brief summary as to why it thought he should remain blacklisted. Having await-
ed a reply from Mr Kadi, in which the latter unsurprisingly again contested his 
listing, the Commission decided to re-list him nonetheless by virtue of a new 
implementing measure in the form of a Commission regulation.72 This regulation 
would ‘enter into force on 3 December 2008’,73 i.e., exactly on the day when the 
previous measures were effectively annulled in accordance with the judgment of 
66. Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.
67. Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, supra n. 53, para. 281.
68. Ibid., para. 326.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., para. 373.
71. Ibid., para. 376.
72. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008 amending for the 101st 
time Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the 
Taliban, OJ 2008, L 322/25.
73. Ibid., Art. 2(1).
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the CJEU. Compliance, regardless of the Court’s clamorous decision and thanks 
to the Commission’s well-timed ‘recycling’ of implementing measures, hence 
remained intact.
Mr Kadi went on to challenge the new measure before the General Court, thus 
launching the Kadi II line of cases. After aligning itself with the reasoning of the 
Court of Justice in its 2010 judgment, the General Court now found in favour of 
Mr Kadi, ruling that the Commission had only paid heed to fundamental rights 
considerations ‘in the most formal and superficial sense’.74 It, too, now seemed to 
take his rights more seriously, including vis-à-vis the compliance with interna-
tional law. The General Court stressed that the UN level had nothing to offer in 
terms of judicial protection, given that even the newly established Office of the 
Ombudsperson ‘cannot be equated with the provision of an effective judicial 
procedure for review of decisions of the Sanctions Committee’.75 It furthermore 
acknowledged that by that point in time ‘the applicant’s funds and other assets 
have been indefinitely frozen for nearly 10 years’.76 This prompted the Court to 
openly doubt the Security Council, which had always emphasized the temporary 
and preventive (i.e., non-penal) nature of the sanctions.77 Hence, it appears that as 
time had passed, the patience of this court to comply with international law at all 
cost had now run out. Therefore, it concluded that the new measures, too, should 
be annulled.
Did this create an actual state of non-compliance? The answer is still ‘no’. Mr 
Kadi remained on the list, thanks to the timely appeal lodged by the Commission, 
the Council and the United Kingdom against the judgment. According to the 
Statute of the CJEU, a decision of the General Court which declares a regulation 
void does not take effect, if an appeal has been brought in good time against that 
decision, until the dismissal of the appeal.78 Hence, any violations of interna-
tional law, any real conflict with the UN Charter, had to wait until after the CJEU 
had held hearings, heard another Opinion of the Advocate General, deliberated 
and eventually delivered its judgment in Kadi II.
While these proceedings ran their course in the hallowed halls of the CJEU in 
‘the fairyland duchy of Luxembourg’,79 in far-away New York City, on 5 October 
74. Kadi v. Commission, supra n. 41, para. 171.
75. Ibid., para. 128.
76. Ibid., para. 149.
77. Ibid., para. 150. The General Court refers here in particular to UN Security Council Res. 1822 
(2008), S/RES/1822, 30 June 2008, in which one of the clauses from the preamble states that such 
sanctions ‘are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national 
law’.
78. Art. 60(2), Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. See 
also ‘The General Court annuls the regulation freezing Yassin Abdullah Kadi’s funds’, Press Release 
No. 95/10, 30 September 2010, available at <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/
pdf/2010-09/cp100095en.pdf>, visited 15 January 2014, which notes this rule at the end of the 
document; and Cuyvers, supra n. 42, p. 496.
79. E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, 75 AJIL (1981) 
p. 1 at p. 1.
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2012, i.e., almost eleven years after Mr Kadi’s initial listing, the UNSC removed 
him from the UN list, ‘after concluding its consideration of the delisting request 
submitted by this individual through the Ombudsperson’.80 One week later, the 
EU followed suit and took Mr Kadi off its anti-terror list as well.81 For all practi-
cal purposes, this is the end of Mr Kadi’s challenges against his sanctions as far 
as their implementation in the EU is concerned. The admittedly non-judicial pro-
cedure at the UN had finally yielded to his requests. With Mr Kadi’s name disap-
pearing from the UN ‘blacklist’, so vanished the obligation under international 
law – under the UN Charter no less – for the Member States and vicariously for 
the EU to apply the sanctions. Ever since the two days it took the EU to implement 
the UN listing in 2001, there was no moment in time when Mr Kadi was off the 
EU’s list while remaining on the UN list.
His delisting in early October 2012 notwithstanding, the hearings for the Kadi 
II appeal took place at the CJEU in mid-October 2012. Subsequently, Advocate 
General Yves Bot delivered his Opinion in the spring of 2013,82 in which he re-
ferred explicitly to the provisions in the TEU urging the EU to comply with in-
ternational law and to contribute to international security.83 He highlighted 
furthermore the progress made at the UN level, in particular the establishment of 
the Office of the Ombudsperson, which he attributed directly to the judicial pres-
sure exerted by the CJEU through its Kadi case law.84 These developments at the 
UN prompted him to argue for more self-restraint by the Court in the intensity of 
its judicial review, noting also the importance of effectively pursuing interna-
tional security and the need to respect international law. While he did not dispute 
the dictum of the CJEU that no acts of the EU enjoy immunity from jurisdiction 
simply because they were adopted with a view to implementing UNSC resolutions, 
this particular context should nonetheless lead to ‘an adaptation of the judicial 
review conducted’ by the Court.85 Applying such a ‘security sensitive’ and ‘inter-
national law friendly’ approach to the case at hand, he advised the Court to set 
aside the General Court’s judgment and to dismiss Mr Kadi’s challenge.
80. UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee deletes entry of Yasin 
Abdullah Ezzedine Qadi from its list’, Press Release SC/10785, 5 October 2012, available at <www.
un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/sc10785.doc.htm>, visited 15 January 2014.
81. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 933/2012 of 11 October 2012 amending for 
the 180th time Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al Qaida network, OJ 2012, L 278/11.
82. Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission, Council and United 
Kingdom v. Kadi (Kadi II), Opinion of Advocate General Bot of 13 March 2013, not yet reported.
83. Ibid., para. 73, referring to Arts. 3(5) TEU, 21(1) and 21(2)(c) TEU. 
84. Ibid., para. 83: ‘As the Ombudsperson has acknowledged, the judgment of the Court of Justice 
in Kadi led to the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson, which has made it possible to 
raise the quality of the list considerably. It would be paradoxical if the Court failed to take account 
of the improvements to which it has directly contributed, even though the Office of the Ombudsperson 
is not a judicial body [footnote omitted].’
85. Ibid., para. 52. 
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The judgment of the Court of Justice, delivered on 18 July 2013, however, did 
not follow the Advocate General. Instead, it clarified the ways in which the EU 
courts are to handle classified information. In essence, it endorsed the principle 
of ‘disclose or delist’,86 which puts the onus of furnishing the Court with probative 
information on the institutions that implemented the restrictive measures at issue.87 
Thus, in addition to its assertion of fundamental rights and the autonomy of the 
EU legal order, in this final judicial episode of the Kadi saga, the CJEU elabo-
rated on the procedures to be followed to safeguard such rights in practice in ju-
dicial proceedings. In the case at hand, after correcting the General Court on points 
of law concerning this aspect,88 it confirmed its conclusion, i.e., the annulment of 
the measures.89 Hence, the annulment already issued by the General Court, given 
that the appeal was dismissed, became effective on the day of the Kadi II judgment 
of the CJEU.
The annulment itself had no practical legal impact on Mr Kadi. Of course, 
clarifying issues pertaining to the treatment of classified information is of gen-
eral relevance and useful regarding future cases. As Advocate General Bot right-
ly pointed out, the fact that Mr Kadi had been delisted ‘after the present appeals 
were lodged, does not … remove the interest in bringing proceedings on the part 
of the Commission, the Council and the United Kingdom or that of Mr Kadi in 
the context of his application for annulment’.90 For future sanctions-related cases, 
it will certainly be interesting to observe how the EU institutions will manage to 
provide sensitive information to the courts. This remains a quintessentially mul-
tilevel problem, as such information will need to be obtained from the UNSC, 
which in turn relies on classified information furnished by UN members.91
With regard to Mr Kadi, however, the annulment came too late in terms of 
serving as an ‘effective remedy’ to unfreeze his assets, which had been – as had 
been confirmed by the courts several times – unlawfully frozen for all these years. 
The right to an effective legal remedy is a general principle of EU law,92 and finds 
86. See for a more in-depth explanation of the operation of this rule, F. Fabbrini, ‘Global Sanctions, 
State Secrets and Supranational Review: Seeking Due Process in an Interconnected World’, in 
D. Cole, et al., eds., Secrecy, National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar 2013) p. 284 at pp. 299-300.
87. Commission, Council and United Kingdom v. Kadi (Kadi II), supra n. 46, paras. 111 et seq.
88. Ibid., paras. 135-149. Essentially, contrary to what the General Court had found, the CJEU 
actually deemed most of the reasons based on which Mr Kadi had been listed to be detailed and 
specific enough. The violations of fundamental rights were, according to the CJEU, due to an 
insufficient substantiation of these reasons.
89. Ibid., para. 164.
90. Commission, Council and United Kingdom v. Kadi (Kadi II), Opinion of Advocate General 
Bot, supra n. 82, para. 42.
91. The Court stressed in Kadi II the need for EU authorities to cooperate with the UN Sanctions 
Committee and other UN members in this respect, Commission, Council and United Kingdom v. 
Kadi (Kadi II), supra n. 46, para. 115, referring to Art. 220(1) TFEU, according to which the EU 
‘shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its 
specialised agencies’.
92. Starting with Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651; and reiterated later in, among others, 
Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677.
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expression in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.93 It is inspired by 
Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the words of the 
ECtHR, effectiveness signifies
‘not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective; this 
is particularly so of the rights of the defence in view of the prominent place held in a 
democratic society by the right to a fair trial, from which they derive.’94
Of course, Mr Kadi could avail himself – repeatedly – of the remedies offered in 
the EU legal order. Eventually, he prevailed over the Commission and the Coun-
cil and he successfully had the measures imposed against him annulled. However, 
his successive victories in court were all rather theoretical in the end. As was 
shown in this section, in 2008 and 2010, the judgments ruling that the measures 
adversely affecting him should be annulled did not have the result of effectively 
delisting him. In 2013, the effects of the measures had already ceased to apply by 
the time the Court of Justice intervened. From this vantage point, the Kadi II judg-
ment was not the grand finale of the saga, but rather an epilogue, a postscript. For 
the EU institutions, on the contrary, the avenues of judicial recourse offered in 
EU law (especially their appeal against the 2010 judgment of the General Court) 
were quite useful, as they kept Mr Kadi on the EU blacklist, not as a matter of 
theory but of practice. In doing so, they effectively maintained compliance with 
international law.
4. CONCLUSION: THE TRIUMPHANT TRIBUNAL
After having, firstly, sketched out the general sentiments in the scholarly discourse 
on the Kadi saga as the legal epitome of the EU’s implementation of targeted 
sanctions hailing from the UNSC, and, secondly, having retraced this string of 
cases from the point of view of actual compliance with international law, the fol-
lowing conclusions emerge. The clamour on the autonomy of the Union legal 
order and the majesty of human rights aside, in reality, the EU and its Member 
States successfully cloaked themselves in a seamless coat of compliance with their 
international obligations, covering the entire period from October 2001 until Mr 
Kadi’s delisting. While vocally upholding human rights as constitutional principles 
of the EU legal order, also against attacks from the UNSC bolstered by the su-
premacy of the UN Charter, what the institutions of the EU achieved in fact was 
living up, all this time, to the objective of strictly observing international law as 
stipulated in Article 3(5) TEU.
By the same token, a conflict with the UN Charter was avoided. At no point in 
time did the EU Member States face opposing obligations, with the UN demand-
93. Art. 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
94. ECtHR 13 May 1980, Artico v. Italy, Appl. No. 6694/74, para. 33.
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ing one thing and the EU requiring the opposite. Only in a rather unworldly ret-
rospective sense, with the annulment of the 2008 regulation being effective thanks 
to the dismissal of the appeal in the 2013 Kadi II judgment, could Mr Kadi be 
conceived of as not having been on the EU’s list, while he remained on the UN 
list. In the words of the CJEU, ‘the contested measure is retroactively erased from 
the legal order and is deemed never to have existed’.95 However, bearing in mind 
the preventive nature of the sanctions regime, the historical fact remains that Mr 
Kadi’s assets were frozen during this entire period, even though we now know in 
hindsight that they should not have been, according to EU law. While this conjures 
up a retroactive conflict between obligations, for all practical purposes, the EU, 
including its courts, did cover this period in this seamless coat of compliance with 
international law, which was only lifted once the obligation under international 
law had already lapsed.
This prompts a final reflection as to the real winner in this legal marathon. For 
Mr Kadi, certainly, his repeated victories in court retain a Pyrrhic character. He 
had to wait almost twelve years before his judicial successes became effective. 
Now that the dust has indeed settled, Bruno Simma’s prescient words could not 
ring truer in that Kadi is among the cases of the CJEU which are ‘grandiose on 
principles without being of much help to the individual claimant’.96 However, an 
option that remains open to Mr Kadi is to lodge a claim for damages against the 
EU under Article 340 TFEU. Such a claim, the success of which is not entirely 
unlikely,97 would turn his thus far rather Pyrrhic victory into a more tangible one.
For the Council and the Commission, as well as the EU Member States, the 
end of the Kadi saga may well be the beginning of new legal battles. While a 
conflict between the EU Treaties and the UN Charter was avoided in this particu-
lar series of cases, the principles established by the CJEU therein are prone to 
place them in a difficult situation in the future. According to the Kadi II decision, 
while the Union institutions did not fail to satisfy the duty to state reasons, the 
crux is the burden of proof, which now unequivocally rests on them to furnish the 
substantiating information justifying the blacklisting of targeted individuals in EU 
courts. Whenever the institutions have to defend their acts and legislation in Lux-
embourg, it has become clear that justifications based solely on ‘the Security 
Council said so’ are clearly not good enough in a Union ‘based on the rule of 
law’.98
How they can achieve that remains, for the time being, an unresolved issue. 
There exists thus far no agreement between the EU and the UN to the effect of 
sharing sensitive information for the purpose of court proceedings in the area of 
targeted sanctions. Already at the UN level, including after recent reforms, it is 
difficult to obtain such information. States are merely encouraged, not obliged, 
95. Commission, Council and United Kingdom v. Kadi (Kadi II), supra n. 46, para. 134.
96. Simma, supra n. 10, p. 294, fn. 122.
97. See Fontanelli, supra n. 48.
98. Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, supra n. 53, para. 281.
KADI  SAGA AS A TALE OF ‘STRICT OBSERVANCE’ 41NILR 2014  
‘to provide all relevant information to the Ombudsperson, including providing 
any relevant confidential information’.99 Hence, as Scheinin and Ginsborg observe, 
‘access to information by the Ombudsperson still depends on the willingness of 
States to disclose information’ which ‘may still choose to withhold any informa-
tion which they deem appropriate to safeguard their security or other interests’.100 
In order to avoid future conflicts, the EU and the Member States (not least France 
and the UK as permanent members of the Security Council) will have to do their 
utmost to help obtain such information, its sensitive and classified nature notwith-
standing, and continue to work on an arrangement to give courts sufficient access 
to such information.
A less obvious winner, but still a winner, is the UNSC. Despite all the judicial 
questioning and second-guessing from Luxembourg, it saw its targeted sanctions 
being applied against Mr Kadi throughout until it, through its ‘1267 Committee’, 
decided to delist him. Instead of creating an immediate conflict, the judgments 
from Luxembourg, together with other vocal criticisms of the UN targeted sanc-
tions regime,101 gave the UN time to adapt. Even though a judicial remedy at the 
UN level remains wanting for blacklisted individuals,102 as the case of Mr Kadi 
shows, the Ombudsperson now contributes to an effective delisting. In this respect, 
it is disappointing that the CJEU all but completely ignored the impact of the work 
of the Office of the Ombudsperson in its Kadi II decision. For the future, if the 
Security Council wants to remain on the winning side, it should strongly con-
sider facilitating the provision of information justifying the sanctions to its mem-
bers, lest courts in the EU put a spoke in the wheels of its sanctions machinery 
after all.
The most unequivocal winner, however, can only be the CJEU. While keeping 
the UNSC and its monitoring body in a constant state of alert, and while being 
celebrated as the brave and ultimate guardian of fundamental rights by many in 
legal scholarship, in Kadi it also asserted the autonomy of the EU legal order, over 
which it looms as the supreme judicial body. As the retracing of this remarkable 
legal saga has shown, this assertion of its power, largely perceived as a norma-
99. UN Security Council Res. 1989 (2011), S/RES/1989, 17 June 2011, para. 25. Note also UN 
Security Council Res. 2083 (2012), S/RES/2083 (2012), 17 December 2012, which welcomes ‘national 
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tively desirable state of affairs, came at a very small price. Throughout the en-
tirety of the Kadi cases, the Court of Justice achieved this feat while successfully 
avoiding any breach of the kind of law from which it endeavours to set EU law 
apart so ferociously: international law.
